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Introduction 
     Generally, scholars who specialize in Asian diplomatic history regard the Foreign 
Relations of the United States (FRUS) and archival materials in the United States as 
important primary resources.  In terms of compiling and making public historical 
documents on relations between the United States and Asian countries, the United States 
has been playing a predominant role.  In contrast, in Asian countries, archival 
documents had been closed to the public and scholars, and it had been very difficult or 
impossible to utilize them for examining historical events. 
In recent years, however, primary resources have gradually been opened in various 
Asian countries, and it has become possible for scholars to analyze diplomatic history 
from Asian as well as from U.S. perspectives.  Taiwan has not been an exception to this 
trend. The situation surrounding Taiwanese archives at such places as the Academia 
Historica, the Academia Sinica, and the Historical Commission of the Central Committee 
of the Kuomintang (KMT) has improved, and formerly unavailable documents have 
become accessible.  As a result, the historical documents including those on the foreign 
policies of the Chiang Kai-shek administration, of the Republic of China (ROC)’s 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and of the KMT have become available for scholars. 
Thanks to these developments, it has become possible to analyze important 
historical events involving Taiwan, such as the Taiwan Strait Crises in the 1950s, and 
historical characters such as Chiang Kai-shek not only from the U.S. but also Taiwanese 
perspectives.  According to the conventional traditional historical interpretation based 
on the U.S. sources, such as the FRUS, U.S. foreign policy concerning the Taiwan Strait 
Crises was primarily defensive, and the United States tried to stop Chiang Kai-shek from 
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launching a counterattack against the mainland China while trying to deter the People’s 
Republic of China (PRC) from taking over Taiwan. 1  Such an interpretation emphasizes 
how hard the U.S. government tried to prevent “reckless” Chiang Kai-shek from 
expanding the military conflict aimed at the PRC. From this perspective, the U.S. policy 
of “unleashing Chiang”, which it pursued toward the Republic of China (ROC) 
government after Taiwan’s de-neutralization declaration in 1953, was an artificial 
psychological strategy or a “bluff” by the United States directed toward the Soviet Union 
and the PRC; but in fact, the U.S. government firmly continued to tie Chiang’s hands 
using ROC military forces.  Moreover, after the two Taiwan Strait crises in the 1950s, 
the U.S. government successfully restrained Chiang from taking offensive actions against 
the PRC, albeit with difficulties.  This is the conventional interpretation of U.S.-ROC 
relations in the 1950s based on U.S. primary sources. 2 
According to ROC historical documents that have recently become available, 
however, it becomes clear that the U.S. government should assume its fair share of blame 
in contributing to the crises, and that its policy toward the ROC was inconsistent or even 
                                                   
1 Thomas E. Stolper, China, Taiwan, and the Offshore Islands: Together with an Implication for 
Outer Mongolia and Sino-Soviet Relations (Armonk, New York and London: M.E. Sharpe, Inc, An 
East Gate Book, 1985); Robert Accinelli, Crisis and Commitment: United State Policy Toward 
Taiwan,1950-1955 (University of North Carolina,1996); John W. Garver, The Sino-American 
Alliance: Nationalist China and American Cold War Strategy in Asia (Armonk, New York and 
London: M.E. Sharpe, Inc, An East Gate Book, 1997).  
2 See Gordon H. Chang, "To the Nuclear Brink: Eisenhower, Dulles, and the Quemoy-Matsu Crisis," 
International Security 2, no. 4 (Spring 1988): 99; He Di, “The Evolution of the People’s Republic of 
China’s Policy toward the Offshore Islands,” pp.222-45 in Warren I. Cohen and Akira Iriye, eds., The 
Great Powers in East Asia, 1953-1960 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1990); Gordon H. 
Chang, Friends and Enemies: The United States, China, and the Soviet Union, 1948-1972 (Stanford, 
California: Stanford University Press, 1990); Thomas J. Christensen, Useful Adversaries: Grand 
Strategy, Domestic Mobilization, and Sino-American Conflict, 1947-1958 (Princeton, New Jersey: 
Princeton University Press, 1996); Shu Guang Zhang, Deterrence and Strategic Culture: 
Chinese-American Confrontations, 1949-1958 (Cornell Studies in Security Affairs, 1992). 
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self-contradictory.  In fact, the documents show that before the First Taiwan Strait 
Crisis, the United States had been pursuing a policy that probably encouraged Chiang to 
retain a glimmer of hope for his ultimate return to the mainland.  It is arguable that such 
a U.S. attitude weakened its own leverage over the ROC government and enabled Chiang 
to behave as he wished to the contrary of U.S. interests.  Moreover, the ROC archival 
materials show that Chiang, even though he may have been “reckless” and “obsessed” 
with the impossible mission of reclaiming the Chinese mainland, was a sophisticated and 
uncanny strategist who possessed a grand vision for East Asia as well as for the survival 
of his regime. 
 This paper uses Taiwan’s archival documents to reexamine the two Taiwan Strait 
crises and the characteristics of Chiang Kai-shek’s strategic thinking.  Section 2 
examines the oscillation of U.S. policy concerning the ROC’s offensive toward mainland 
China and the defense of the Da-chen islands before and after the initiation of the First 
Taiwan Strait Crisis in 1954-1955.  Doing so will highlight the contradictory U.S. 
attitude that contributed to the crisis and weakened its ability to control Chiang.  
Section 3 focuses on Chiang Kai-shek’s strategic vision toward East Asia.  In particular, 
this section focuses on his strategic thinking and tries to assess whether or not he was a 
“reckless” or “irrational” leader as often described in the previous research on his 
personality.  This paper ends by summarizing its findings and suggests future research 
agendas. 
 
2. Taiwan Strait Crisis and the Defense of Taiwan 
(1) Issues of Taiwan’s Counterattack against Mainland China 
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The conventional interpretation posits that the U.S. government had been trying, 
with enormous difficulties, to deter reckless and unreasonable Chiang Kai-shek from 
launching military operations against the PRC.  Throughout the 1950s, Chiang 
frequently attempted to persuade the U.S. government to support the ROC’s 
counteroffensives against the mainland.  In the end, however, the United States did not 
yield in its refusal to approve the ROC’s large-scale military offensives, forcing Chiang 
to give up opportunities to do so.  Looking at Chiang’s behavior this way, his proposal 
to conduct a counteroffensive against the PRC reflected his reckless, risk-taking 
personality.  
However, according to Taiwan’s archival documents, this interpretation is not 
necessarily accurate.  These documents indicate that the U.S. government’s attitude 
toward the ROC’s counteroffensive against mainland China was inconsistent.  More 
importantly, the U.S. government even displayed a supportive attitude toward the ROC 
government’s counterattack against the mainland at least before the First Taiwan Strait 
Crisis; at least immediately before the first crisis, the U.S. government actively 
encouraged the ROC government to renew its interests in conducting counteroffensives 
against the mainland.  Although it is usually believed that the United States was 
“entrapped” into the crisis due to Chiang’s attempts to do so, the United States actively 
contributed to the escalation of the crisis. 
According to the minutes of a meeting on February 1, 1953 between ROC 
President Chiang and the U.S. Ambassador to Taipei, Karl L. Rankin, the latter indicated 
that the purpose of U.S. military aid to the ROC had practically shifted from defense to 
offense.  Rankin said as follows to Chiang: 
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During the past week, I have been working on a comprehensive report to the 
State Department.  The point in this report is a recommendation for increased 
military aid.  I proposed in the first place that there should be a definite purpose of 
this aid.  It has been often [said] that our aid is to defend Taiwan.  However, the 
aid program has already gone beyond the defense stage.  If this should mean that 
the purpose of the aid has changed from defensive to offensive, then let it be clearly 
said and we can work out a program accordingly 3   
 
It should be noted that this meeting was held right before the U.S. government declared 
on February 2, 1953 that the U.S. Seventh Fleet would no longer stop the ROC from 
launching attacks against Communist China. According to the conventional interpretation, 
this declaration hardly represented the U.S. decision to “unleash” Chiang Kai-shek. 4  
But this document shows that the day before the declaration, a high-ranking U.S. official 
had indicated to Chiang that they should be prepared for a policy change from defensive 
to offensive, signaling to Chiang that he should expect a policy change in the direction 
favorable to the ROC. 
The conversation that took place between Chiang Kai-shek and the Chairman of U.S. 
Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), Arthur W. Radford, on June 4, 1953 was more revealing.  
Radford raised the question of a joint U.S.-ROC military command in case of operations 
against the mainland and explored whether President Chiang would be willing to give the 
ROC command authority to the U.S side.  Radford mentioned: 
 
In case the United States Air Force and Navy were to support a landing of Chinese 
                                                   
3 412.7/0011, Diplomatic Archives (Waijiaobu Dangan), Institute of Modern History, Academia 
Sinica, Taiwan. 
4 Nancy B. Tucker, “John Foster Dulles and the Taiwan Roods of the ‘Two Chinas’ Policy,” in 
Richard H. Immerman, ed, John Foster Dulles and the Diplomacy of the Cold War (Princeton, NJ: 
Princeton University Press, 1990), p.239; Foster Rhea Dulles, American Policy toward Communist 
China, 1949-1969 (NewYork: Thomas Y. Crowell, 1972), P.131; Harry Harding, “The Legacy of the 
Decade for Later Years: An American Perspective,” in Harding and Yuan, eds., Sino-American 
Relations, p321. 
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ground forces on the mainland, would the President accept the American practices 
of giving command to the United States Navy from the time of departure of the 
invasion fleet to the moment when the ground forces were ready to take over 
command.  Second, if American ground forces should participate in the initial 
operations on the mainland, would the President agree to have an American assume 
command of all ground forces until such time as the American ground forces were 
ready to retire. 5   
 
The idea of ROC forces operating under the U.S. command, as Radford suggests, must 
have reminded Chiang of the UN Command that integrated South Korean forces with the 
U.S. military during the Korean War, implying that the United States would be willing to 
take the lead in conducting a U.S.-ROC joint military operation against the mainland.  
This was a hypothetical question for Radford, but it is not too difficult to imagine that the 
mere fact that the top U.S. military official directly brought such a matter to Chiang must 
have raised ROC expectations toward the United States.  Of course, Chiang 
immediately responded that he would accept both proposals put forward by Radford.  
He also said that in order to implement the plan to put ROC forces under U.S. command, 
it was necessary to involve military officers and have them study more detailed 
procedures to do so. 6 
 Chiang Kai-shek must have been rejuvenated by Radford’s proposal. In his 
conversation with Radford the next day, June 5, 1954, Chiang spoke more concretely 
about conducting a large-scale counter-invasion plan against mainland China.  In the 
meeting Chiang proposed to Radford that in support of invasion operations, he would 
want 10,000 paratroopers trained and equipped by the United States as soon as possible. 
                                                   
5 412/0052, Diplomatic Archives, Institute of Modern History, Academia Sinica, Taiwan. 
6 Ibid. 
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Furthermore, Chiang argued that after the completion of the plan stated above, he would 
like to see another 25,000 paratroops trained so that they could be used to support 
invasion operations.  Radford politely dismissed Chiang’s proposal saying that the use 
of paratroopers in such a large-scale operation was too risky and had little prospect of 
success, and argued that Chiang should consider an alternative and more practical 
strategy.  However, they confirmed that further study should be continued in preparation 
for a counter-invasion plan against the mainland. 
 
(2) Defense of the Da-chen Island 
As mentioned above, before the First Taiwan Strait Crisis, U.S. government 
officials had expressed a positive attitude toward the ROC’s use of force against the PRC, 
but the U.S. attitude gradually changed after the first crisis.  On September 3, 1954, 
PRC artillery began shelling the KMT-held offshore islands, Quemoy.  During the crisis 
in December 1954, a mutual security treaty was concluded between the United States and 
the ROC.  However, the fact that the offshore islands adjacent to the Chinese coast were 
not explicitly included in the mutual security treaty may have invited the PRC’s attack 
against Da-chen Island, one of the ROC-held offshore islands, in January 1955.  
Defending Da-chen was not favorable for the U.S. and ROC, and since the United States 
considered the island’s strategic value as less than that of Quemoy and Matsu, it 
proposed that the ROC withdraw its forces from the island.  
According to the conventional interpretation, the U.S. government experienced 
extreme difficulty in persuading Chiang Kai-shek to withdraw from the Da-chen Island. 7  
                                                   
7 Gordon H. Chang, “To the Nuclear Brink: Eisenhower, Dulles, and Quemoy-Matsu Crisis,” 
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Because of this, it is often argued that Chiang was irrationally obsessed with the defense 
of the offshore islands despite the huge risk of causing a major military clash. 
It is true that Chiang did not easily accept the withdrawal of ROC forces from 
Da-chen Island. But ROC archival records show that there was a legitimate reason why 
Chiang was so reluctant to accept the withdrawal.  As it turned out, Chiang did not 
simply persist in defending Da-chen Island in order to keep the hope of ultimately 
returning to the mainland; it was the United States that had encouraged and even 
instructed the ROC to fortify the defenses of Da-chen before the First Taiwan Strait 
Crisis.  The ROC archival documents reveal that before the start of the crisis, the U.S. 
government strongly encouraged the ROC government to enhance Da-chen’s defenses, 
and even recommended the ROC to blockade the PRC’s shipping around Da-chen and 
other offshore islands. 8 
There remain numerous communications between the U.S. and ROC militaries 
concerning their discussions of the defense of Da-chen Island and blockading the PRC 
around the island. In February 1953 in a letter by William C. Chase, Major General, 
USA Chief to the ROC’s Ministry of National Defense, Chase suggested that 
“immediate thought be given and plans be made to blockade the China Mainland, with 
respect to Chinese Communists shipping only, from Swatow to Da-chen, both inclusive.”  
Furthermore, Chase explained that the ROC military should consult with the U.S. side 
on this plan so that the U.S. military would be able “to assist [ROC forces] every 
possible way.” 9 
                                                                                                                                                              
International Security, Vol. 12, No. 4 (Spring 1988), pp. 96-122.  
8 409/0236, Diplomatic Archives, Institute of Modern History, Academia Sinica, Taiwan. 
9 409/0236, Diplomatic Archives, Institute of Modern History, Academia Sinica, Taiwan. 
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     It is important to note that the ROC military initially was not enthusiastic about the 
blockade plan near Da-chen because it considered that Da-chen’s defenses were fragile 
and that it would be difficult to blockade near the island without strengthening the ROC’s 
defense capabilities there. 10  The ROC even argued that if the U.S. government still 
wanted the ROC to strengthen the defense of the offshore islands, additional military aid 
and assistance from the United States would be required. 11 While this counter-proposal 
may have been partly an ROC tactic to receive more aid from the United States, the fact 
that the ROC was aware of the difficulty of defending Da-chen Island in itself was 
significant. 
The United States requested on another occasion that the ROC government 
should increase the latter’s defense efforts for the offshore islands, Da-chen Island in 
particular, as the U.S. military was in the process of reviewing defense plans for Taiwan 
and the offshore islands. In a meeting with ROC Foreign Minister George Yeh (Yeh 
Kung-ch’ao) on August 12, 1953, U.S. Ambassador Rankin stated the following: 
 
Washington very much hoped that the Chinese Government would make every 
effort to hold the islands, particularly Tachen (Da-chen), while the matter of 
integrating those islands into the defense scheme of Taiwan and the Pescadores was 
being actively studied pending the assumption of office of Admiral Radford as 
Chairman of the Joint Chief of Staff. 12 
 
As this message indicates, by August 1954 the U.S. government was actively 
encouraging the ROC to defend the offshore islands including Da-chen, just before the 
first Taiwan Strait Crisis erupted.  The situation around that time did not allow Chiang 
                                                   
10 Ibid. 
11 Ibid. 
12 426.2/0001, Diplomatic Archives, Institute of Modern History, Academia Sinica, Taiwan. 
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Kai-shek to refuse such a U.S. request, as the ROC was in the midst of negotiations with 
the United States on concluding a mutual security treaty. The defense of Da-chen should 
be considered in this context. 
However, the U.S. government reversed its attitude toward the offshore islands 
after the First Taiwan Strait Crisis began as it recognized the operational difficulties and 
risks involving the defense of these islands.  When the U.S. government asked the ROC 
to withdraw its troops from the Da-chen Island, Chiang Kai-shek strongly criticized such 
sudden change in U.S. policy.  Chiang’s reaction was natural and understandable, given 
that he had been trying to improve the island’s defense because the United States had 
asked him to do so.  Therefore, Chiang’s attitude should not be considered as a symbol 
of his “reckless” attitude or his “groundless ambition” to return to the mainland.  In the 
end, as a result of the U.S. government’s strong pressure, ROC forces on Da-chen were 
compelled to withdraw in February 1955. Naturally, the U.S. government’s sudden policy 
change made Chiang Kai-shek distrustful of the U.S. government. 
Judging from the analysis provided above, it is not an exaggeration that certain 
U.S. actions toward the ROC and high U.S. officials’ communications with Chiang 
Kai-shek encouraged Chiang to preserve and increase his expectation that the United 
States might help him initiate counteroffensives against the PRC and possibly return to 
the mainland.  It may be reasonable and logical to think that such a U.S. attitude then 
weakened its bargaining power over the ROC government, and in fact enabled Chiang to 
behave in a way not favorable to U.S. interests.  The fact that the United States had 
enormous difficulties in persuading Chiang to withdraw from Da-chen can be explained 
quite well by this reasoning, even without considering Chiang’s personality and 
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character.  
 
3. Chiang Kai-shek’s Strategic Vision toward East Asia 
(1) The Logical Consistency of Chiang Kai-shek’s Strategic Thinking  
In the previous section, it was shown that Chiang Kai-shek was not necessarily 
overly reckless or irrational, and what seemed to be his aggressive reactions to U.S. 
policies during the First Taiwan Strait Crisis are in a sense understandable if one takes 
into account the U.S. behavior toward the ROC before the crisis.  Indeed, the ROC 
documents show that Chiang Kai-shek was rather a sophisticated thinker who possessed 
a strategic vision toward East Asia and was able to put the survival of the ROC in that 
broad vision.  
The ROC memo dated November 25, 1949 shows that Chiang Kai-shek was 
contemplating an intriguing and uncanny idea that he might have proposed to the U.S. 
government.  Titled “Proposed Sino-American Agreements Concerning Taiwan,” the 
document shows that the ROC proposed, or at least considered proposing that the ROC 
should “enter into three separate agreements with the United States with respect to 
Keelung, Kaohsiung and the Taiwan Railroad in terms identical with those contained in 
the Sino-Soviet Agreements of 1945 concerning Dairen, Port Arthur and Chinese Eastern 
Railway” 13 (emphasis added).  This means that the United States and the ROC would 
form an alliance so that the United States would keep military bases in the two cities in 
Taiwan and retain the right to operate the Taiwan Railroad.  
There is no doubt that this was Chiang’s desperate attempt to keep the Harry 
                                                   
13 412/0006, Diplomatic Archives, Institute of Modern History, Academia Sinica, Taiwan. 
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Truman administration from “abandoning” the ROC and from seeking to establish 
working relations with the PRC. 14  However, the shrewd and immensely sophisticated 
character of Chiang Kai-shek can be seen in the intension behind this proposal.  First, 
the ROC government considered that such agreements could be used to harass the PRC in 
its dealings with the Soviet Union in northern China.  The November 25 document says: 
 
The Agreement must be publicized as true copies of the Sino-Soviet Agreements of 
1945 concerning Manchuria.  What the Chinese Communists condone about 
Dairen, Port Arthur and the Chinese Eastern Railway should also, from the 
nationalistic viewpoint, be acceptable to them regarding similar arrangements with 
the U.S. regarding Keelung, Kaohsiung and the Taiwan Railway. By acknowledging 
Chinese sovereignty over Taiwan without waiting for a traditional peace treaty with 
Japan, the U.S. would show boldness in recognizing the validity of the Cairo 
Declaration, the Potsdam Declaration and the Instrument of Surrender as legal and 
binding international agreements. 15 
 
By publicizing such an agreement, the ROC government believed that it could put the 
PRC in an awkward position; if the PRC had tried to blame the United States for the 
latter’s privileges obtained in the agreement, it would have inevitably highlighted the 
similar problems that had been created between the Soviet Union and the PRC as a result 
of the 1945 Sino-Soviet agreement.  Needless to say, the fact that the 1945 Sino-Soviet 
agreement was negotiated by the ROC, not the Chinese Communists, made this tactic 
awfully wily. The following passage in the same document is even more interesting. It 
states: 
 
Even if the Communists should succeed in invading Taiwan, the U.S. should not 
                                                   
14 By that time, the U.S. White Paper on China had been already published, indicating to the ROC 
that the U.S. government was being prepared for abandoning the ROC. 
15 421/0006, Diplomatic Archives, Institute of Modern History, Academia Sinica, Taiwan. 
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directly participate against them but should prepare to recognize the Peking 
government on the condition that the Peking regime would recognize and respect 
American rights under this agreement. The U.S. should insist upon its treaty rights 
just as Russia enjoyed its rights in Manchuria under both regimes. Alternatively, 
withdrawal of the U.S. from Taiwan could only be made condition on Russia’s 
withdrawal from Manchuria. 16 
 
Here, the ROC government was probably trying to demonstrate to the U.S. government 
the benefits of concluding the proposed agreement with itself.  On the one hand, the 
passage reassured the United States that it would not have to intervene even if the ROC 
were defeated by the PRC.  Even if such a defeat were to occur, the United States would 
still be able to use the agreement to harass Soviet-PRC relations by highlighting Soviet 
privileges in the PRC.  
 The fact that Chiang Kai-shek was a sophisticated strategist can be seen in three 
meetings he had on November 9, 1953 with U.S. Vice President Richard Nixon, who was 
visiting Taipei.  In the meetings Chiang displayed his own view regarding the strategic 
situation in East Asia and laid out his idea of how to deal with it.  First, Chiang 
elaborated how he viewed the Soviet strategy in East Asia. He argued that “[i]n Soviet 
strategy, cold war is hot war,” indicating that Soviet strategic interests lay in buying time 
to develop its own capabilities while keeping the United States engaged in constant Cold 
War tensions without its own direct involvement.  From this, Chiang predicted Soviet 
reaction to a counter-offensive against the PRC as follows:  
 
It is my conviction that Russia will never intervene openly in the hostilities when 
we launch a counter-attack on the Mainland because that would defeat the Soviet 
                                                   
16  407.1/0185, Diplomatic Archives, Institute of Modern History, Academia Sinica, Taiwan. 
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policy of not taking an active part in war but of actually achieving its program of 
world conquest without getting itself directly involved militarily. To my mind, 
Russia will never enter into a war unless it is absolutely necessary. The question 
naturally arises as to when it will be absolutely necessary for Russia to enter into a 
war. I believe the time will come when the balance of power between the United 
States and Russia will be drastically upset; that is, when most of the countries of the 
world are either pro-Communist or have adopted a neutral stand and the United 
States is placed in an isolated position. 17 
 
This logic was certainly self-serving; since the ROC needed to get substantial U.S. 
support for launching its counter-attack against the PRC, it wanted to persuade the U.S. 
government that Soviet involvement in a war against the PRC was unlikely.  Even so, 
the logic that Chiang employed here was not inconsistent but rather close to the line of 
hawkish realists, although he still may have underestimated the possibility of Soviet 
intervention to support the PRC.  
  The second interesting point that Chiang made in his meetings with Nixon is 
included in his following statement. 
 
   To resist effectively Soviet aggression in East Asia and prevent the expansion of 
Soviet influence toward the Pacific, a pact between the Republic of China, Japan 
and the Republic of Korea is necessary…. My opinion is that our objective will be 
partially achieved if, with American backing, a pact can be first signed between 
the Republic of Korea and the Republic of China.  A Sino-Japanese pact with 
American backing would also be desirous.  Most Asiatic peoples are afraid of 
Japan and this is particularly true of the Koreans.  But I think otherwise.  I am 
willing to let bygones be bygones.  For the sake of fighting Communism, I 
believe this is the only attitude the Asiatic people should take.  After China is 
allied with the Republic of Korea on the one hand, and with Japan on the other, the 
fundamental requirement for the three countries to fight Russia together would 
have been largely met although there would be two pacts instead of one.  
However, both pacts, to become effective, must have the support of the United 
                                                   
17 407.1/0185, Diplomatic Archives, Institute of Modern History, Academia Sinica, Taiwan. 
 18 
 
States. 18 
 
What was noteworthy in this statement was Chiang’s strategic view toward the role of 
Japan in his East Asia strategy.  Of course, China was the largest victim of Japan’s 
pre-WWII aggression, and as the leader of the ROC, Chiang must have had negative 
feelings toward Japan, or at least must have faced pressures from his supporters who 
maintained hostility to Japan.  Such emotional or political aspects were hardly 
observable in Chiang’s statement; he considered the importance of Japan from a purely 
strategic perspective, and argued for tolerant attitude toward Japan.  Furthermore, 
recognizing Koreans’ negative attitude toward Japan, Chiang proposed two separate 
security pacts, one between South Korea and the ROC and the other between Japan and 
the ROC. This reflects his sense of pragmatism.  
 This does not mean that Chiang considered that concluding a security pact with 
Japan was a realistic prospect.  In fact, Chiang was concerned about an increasing 
neutralist tendency in Japan.  Around the Second Taiwan Strait Crisis in 1958, for 
instance, the ROC government was carefully watching the heated debates within the 
Japanese Diet concerning the danger that Japan might be entrapped by the crisis; the 
archival materials included the copies of Japanese newspapers on the subjects. Probably 
for this reason, the ROC government had a strong concern about the Japanese political 
situation regarding revising the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty. 19  The ROC government 
carefully studied the argument about the scope of the treaty’s geographical application, 
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particularly whether or not the treaty would apply in the event of an emergency in the 
Taiwan Strait. 20  
 
(2) Other Characteristics of Chiang Kai-shek’s Strategic Assessments  
 Another interesting feature of Chiang Kai-shek’s thinking is his assessment of 
the danger of a Soviet “peace offensive” and its potential effects to promote neutralism in 
the United States and Asia. Among the ROC archival materials, Chiang’s critical 
assessment of neutralism in Asia and the United States is conspicuous.  Around the 
period when the two Taiwan Strait crises occurred, he was warning about the danger of a 
prevailing “neutralism.” 21  For example, he sent a letter to Eisenhower on April 15, 
1953 in which he emphasized that the Soviet Union’s recent peace offensive should be 
carefully studied.  In Chiang’s point of view, the peace offensive only served to further 
strengthen the Soviet Union’s initiative in the world.  He pointed out as follows:  
 
I believe that the peace offensive was launched to gain time for the consolidation of 
power on the part of the new Soviet hierarchy at home and for exerting tighter 
control over the satellites abroad…. The present overtures from Soviet Russia, be 
they of an offensive or defensive character, must not be allowed to neutralize what 
you have already achieved or to forestall what you have set out to achieve. 22 
 
Chiang Kai-shek was particularly critical of British “neutralism” and argued that 
it was not acceptable in East Asia. 
                                                   
20 013.1/0007, Diplomatic Archives, Institute of Modern History, Academia Sinica, Taiwan. 
21 Chiang also expressed his concern about the Soviet peace offensive on July 20, 1956 (407.1/0186, 
Diplomatic Archives, Institute of Modern History, Academia Sinica, Taiwan). In February 1958, he 
expressed that U.S. policy toward the Soviet Union might strengthen neutralist positions in Indonesia 
and Japan. The archival evidence also shows that Chiang was greatly apprehensive about Soviet 
leader Nikita Khrushchev’s visit to the United States in 1959. (405.21/0059, Diplomatic Archives, 
Institute of Modern History, Academia Sinica, Taiwan). 
22 412.4/0085, Diplomatic Archives, Institute of Modern History, Academia Sinica, Taiwan. 
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There is something else besides Communism which is still potentially more 
dangerous to the free world—that is, the so-called neutralism under Britain’s 
leadership.  Our most important task, therefore, is how to make the British 
understand our anti-Communist struggle, and especially to prevent them from 
opposing the U.S. role of leading the anti-Communist front…in East Asia, since the 
people here would never again accept Britain’s leadership.  Britain should not 
interfere with the anti-Communist efforts in this area nor with the anti-Communist 
policy of the United States…I hope the United States Government, when the time 
comes, will tell the British on our behalf that if they don’t stand in the way of out 
anti-Communist efforts then we can assure them that when we fight back to the 
Mainland we shall return their properties and protect their legitimate interests. 23 
 
Chiang regarded British diplomatic recognition of the PRC as an appeasement of 
Communism, and argued that British policy was a major obstacle to promoting the 
anti-Communist efforts in Asia. Therefore, he asked the United States to exert its 
influence over Britain to change the latter’s diplomatic attitude toward China.  
 Behind Chiang’s concern about neutralism lay his skepticism of the U.S. attitude 
toward the ROC.  On the one hand, Chiang Kai-shek had a deep distrust toward the U.S. 
government, which was understandable given the ambivalent U.S. attitude described 
above. On the other side, he desperately needed U.S. support, thus feared that the United 
States might abandon the ROC government and develop a close relationship with 
Communist China.  The mixture of these feelings led Chiang to emphasize the danger of 
neutralism in its dealings with the United States. 
 The ROC documents also show that its government carefully watched internal 
developments in the PRC, the confusion and chaos caused by the Great Leap Forward in 
particular.  There are a number of ROC’s documents submitted by the National Bureau 
                                                   
23 407.1/0185, Diplomatic Archives, Institute of Modern History, Academia Sinica, Taiwan. 
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of Security (Guojiaanquanju) titled “Current Situation in the PRC” 
(Zhonggongxiankuang).  Many of these analyses were focused on the negative impacts 
of the Great Leap Forward, including the poor functioning of the people’s communes, 
suppression of religious activities, rapes, and the spread of epidemic disease in mainland 
China.  Therefore, the ROC regarded the Great Leap Forward as a hopeless social 
endeavor. 24 The “Current Situation in the PRC” in 1958, for instance, cited concrete 
examples of many people starving to death in several people’s communes due to the ill 
functioning of food distribution in Guangdong Province, and of the deaths of many 
citizens in riots opposing the corruption of Chinese Communist Party officials. The ROC 
government grasped from these reports that the people’s communes were absurdly 
malfunctioning and causing domestic chaos within the PRC. 25 
As described above, Chiang Kai-shek was not necessarily “reckless” or 
“irrational” as often described previously.  It is true that his strategic vision was 
self-serving, but that does not mean that it was logically inconsistent or illogical. Rather, 
the ROC documents show that Chiang had a broad strategic vision about East Asia and 
tried to put the survival of the ROC in that perspective.  The documents also show that 
he was capable of a sophisticated diplomatic maneuvering and possessed a certain degree 
of pragmatism.  
 
4. Conclusion and a Future Research Agenda 
This paper examined ROC archival documents in Taiwan to present a fuller 
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Taiwan. 
25 Ibid. 
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understanding of the Taiwan Strait Crises in the 1950s and how Chiang Kai-shek dealt 
with them in the broader strategic context in which he and the ROC were situated.  In 
doing so, the paper first focused on the U.S. government’s contradictory policy regarding 
the issues of the ROC’s counterattack against the PRC and the defense of Da-chen Island.  
It then focused on Chiang Kai-shek’s strategic thinking toward East Asia, highlighting 
the characteristics of his thinking.  By doing these, this paper challenged the 
conventional interpretation that Chiang Kai-shek was a reckless or irrational leader who 
insisted on returning to the Chinese mainland.  In fact, Taiwan’s archival documents 
show that the U.S. government itself should be blamed for encouraging the ROC 
government to consider counterattacks against the mainland.  It is true that Chiang 
Kai-shek was also seeking every opportunity to get the United States involved in 
counterattacking mainland China.  However, Chiang’s thinking was logically consistent, 
and he was arguably a pragmatic strategist who was able to see East Asia in broad 
strategic perspective.  
Of course, there are limitations in this study.  As the title of this paper indicates, it 
provides a perspective from Taiwan’s standpoint, and there may be other ROC 
perspectives that could be discovered by utilizing other Taiwanese archival sources.  
More relevant sources may be available at the Academia Historica, or Chiang Kai-shek’s 
diary available at the Hoover Institute of Stanford University may provide more 
materials to analyze.  Archival documents such as these could add more to the 
understanding of Chiang Kai-shek’s character.  
This study provides some implications for future research.  First, it is necessary 
to find out whether analyzing more Taiwanese archival sources will reveal other ways of 
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interpreting the ROC’s perspective toward the Taiwan Strait Crises.  As pointed out 
above, plenty of room is left for more archival research; thus more archival research 
utilizing the Taiwan’s sources should be encouraged.  Second, it may be fruitful to 
explore how Chiang’s perception of U.S. policy toward the ROC may have influenced his 
later approach toward the United States and the issue of returning to mainland China.  
As discussed in this paper, U.S. handling of the two Taiwan Strait crises probably 
strengthened Chiang distrust toward the U.S. government.  It is also arguable that 
Chiang’s warning about the spread of neutralism in Asia and the United States reflected 
his lack of trust in the U.S. government.  It is quite possible that these sentiments 
Chiang came to hold may have influenced his subsequent policy toward the U.S. 
government.  For instance, Chiang’s distrust toward the U.S. government may have led 
to the ROC’s unilateral declaration in 1962 of its intension to conduct counteroffensive 
operations against the mainland China.  In future research, it may be interesting to 
explore whether such a linkage between Chiang’s beliefs and the 1962 declaration 
existed, or how these two may have been related to each other. 
